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The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and the
Pursued Refugee: Lessons
from Letelier v. Chile
Michael E. Tigar*
INTRODUCTION: THE UNITED STATES AS REFUGE
On September 21, 1976, members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement
(CNM), acting at the direction of the Chilean secret police agency DINA,
detonated a bomb in the automobile of Orlando Letelier, formerly ambas-
sador of the Salvador Allende government to the United States. Ambassa-
dor Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt, his associate at the Transnational
Institute for Policy Studies, were killed. Michael Moffitt, riding in the car,
was injured. 1
The bombing was designed to silence Letelier, an able and vigorous
opponent of the military junta in Chile who had lived in the United States
with his wife and family. He had been ambassador to the United States
under President Salvador Allende, and upon returning to Chile early in
1973, was foreign minister and later defense minister. After the military
coup in September 1973, he was jailed by the junta. Upon his release after
a year in junta detention, he became, from exile, one of the most eloquent
and effective campaigners against the junta.
Michael Townley, the American-born DINA agent who was commis-
sioned to plan the attack and to hire the Cubans, had been involved in
other assassinations and attempted assassinations of anti-Pinochet figures
who had sought refuge in other countries.
The assassination was ordered by DINA head Manuel Contreras Sepul-
veda, with the concurrence of Chilean President Pinochet. The plan was
carried forward by DINA officers Pedro Espinoza Bravo and Armando
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Fernandez Larios. Townley actually made the deal with CNM members for
their participation, drawing on an earlier DINA connection with anti-
Castro terrorist organizations in the United States. Townley tracked Lete-
lier in Washington, D.C., for days before the killing, prepared the explo-
sive device, and then left town. CNM members Alvin Ross Diaz, Virgilio
Paz Romero, and Guillermo Novo Sampol detonated the device.
I have, since the day after the murders, served as counsel to the Letelier
and Moffitt families, and much of this article is based upon the legal and
factual research that led to filing a civil suit against the Republic of Chile
and the individuals responsible for the deaths. This case went to judgment
on November 5, 1980, resulting in an award of compensatory and punitive
damages totalling $4.9 million. In this essay, I ask what it tells us about
the international legal order, and what remedies exist for acts of interna-
tional terrorism that have an impact on the United States.
The pursuit of refugees into countries of exile is no new phenomenon.
The political tumults of mid-19th century Europe sent countless people
fleeing the vengeance of victorious reactionary governments. 2 England
was a popular gathering spot, having determined that it would not extra-
dite for political offenses. England had, to some refugee leaders, an "old-
established reputation ... as the safest asylum for refugees of all parties
and of all countries," 3 despite sporadic efforts to enforce statutory authori-
ty for the expulsion of aliens whose presence was embarrassing. The exiles
in London found themselves hounded by the secret police of their coun-
tries, operating apparently from the sanctity of diplomatic premises. There
is even some indication that the British Government cooperated in these
surveillance efforts .
4
These events are not without modern parallels. In one case, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, in order to enhance the stature of an FBI double
agent in the eyes of the Polish Government, passed information through
the agent about Polish applicants for political asylum in the United States.
Apparently, the FBI also handed on information about an attorney for the
applicants, a United States citizen, as well. The confidentiality of informa-
tion concerning Nicaraguan and Haitian refugees has also been breached. 5
Lacunae in the Privacy Act and regulations under it may make such disclo-
sures lawful, 6 but they certainly serve the interest of foreign governments
bent upon following their subjects' activities in the United States-for
whatever purpose. For this reason, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees regards confidentiality as important in the refugee process. 7
Nor do these disclosures provide the only cause for concern. A Senate
committee conducted an investigation from 1977 to 1980 into the activities
of foreign secret police agencies in the United States. 8 The "Koreagate" 9
inquiry also involved, to a lesser extent, the United States operations of the
Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The House Committee on
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Government Operations has investigated the cooperation between DINA
(the Chilean secret police) and LAN Chile Airlines (the Chilean flag carrier)
in the Letelier-Moffitt murders and in other DINA activities outside
Chile. 10
The Senate committee's findings were the most far-reaching and star-
tling. The secret police agencies of Israel (Mossad), Chile (DINA, later
CNI), Iran (SAVAK), South Korea (KCIA), Yugoslavia (UDBA), and other
countries have for years operated in the United States with the knowledge
of American authorities. Some of these agencies are, to be sure, the step-
children of the Central Intelligence Agency, having been sponsored,
financed, trained, and assisted by the CIA. 11 This relationship provides a
motive, though not a justification, for permitting them to act on American
soil.
The events leading to the Letelier-Moffitt murders provide an interest-
ing and-in its broad outlines-typical example of a secret police operation
directed at a dissident in exile. Cuban nationalist organizations had for
years been trained, equipped, and supported as a matter of American
policy. These organizations continued to function without formal CIA
support after the United States abandoned the notion of toppling the
Castro government by overt military operations. Acting under rubrics such
as Omega 7, Brigade 2506, and the Cuban Nationalist Movement (CNM),
but with an overlap of personnel and equipment, anti-Castro terrorists
continue to commit bombings and assassinations directed at Cuban and
Eastern European property and diplomatic personnel in the United States.
They have also sought alliances with others of like mind.
CNM personnel and equipment were used by DINA agent Townley to
kill Letelier and Moffitt under an established cooperation arrangement
which had, prior to September 1976, involved trading of explosives, DINA
provision of detonation devices, and the use of LAN Chile facilities to
transport these items. Indeed, there is evidence that a pattern of coopera-
tion in tracking down Chilean exiles was agreed upon between DINA
agents and Cuban nationalists in 1974 and 1975 in Miami. The Pinochet
government also attempted, in preparing for the Letelier murder, to enlist
the aid of Paraguayan officials.
The Letelier-Moffitt murders raise two questions for international law-
yers: First, what is the extent of American judicial power over terrorists
who pursue refugees across international boundaries? And second, if the
power exists, what theories of recovery are available? In turning to consid-
er these questions, I place them firmly in the context of the Letelier-Moffitt
murders. I do not apologize for doing so; as lawyers we are all the better
able to see clearly the making and applying of a norm if we keep firmly
in mind the human suffering we are seeking to redress and the human
consequences of our actions. One's attitude towards American foreign
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policy in the Third World no doubt influences one's view of particular
proposals about the role of courts and lawyers in creating and enforcing
norms of behavior towards refugees: I certainly confess my own bias. One
must, in any case, acknowledge that the proposals one makes involve
something more than a technical adjustment of this or that substantive or
procedural rule.
JURISDICTION
Civil Versus Criminal Remedies
The investigative resources of government are formidable. The federal
government's pursuit of the Letelier-Moffitt matter resulted in one DINA
agent's plea of guilty to conspiracy to murder, and the trial of three CNM
members. 12 The criminal process does not repay the financial harm to the
survivors of Letelier and Moffitt. Nor has it brought to justice those who
bore principal responsibility for planning the murders and for designing
and maintaining the apparatus of terror which brought them about. To
gain power over assassins and plotters who have gone to ground back in
their own countries, the criminal process must ultimately rely upon extra-
dition or expulsion, creatures of, respectively, the judicial and executive
branches of the foreign state. Extradition of the Chilean authors of the
Letelier-Moffitt murders failed, 13 the Chilean Supreme Court being servi-
ent to the junta. But government's power to summon witnesses before a
grand jury is mirrored by individuals' rights under civil discovery proce-
dures, and the rights of governmental and private parties to obtain infor-
mation abroad are nearly equal, at least as a matter of formal rules. 14
Admittedly, government has more resources, and a panoply of political
and diplomatic sanctions denied to private individuals, but the federal
government was from the first reluctant to pursue the Letelier investigation
wherever it might lead, fearful perhaps of what it might find. 15 A civil suit
emerged as the available remedy.
Civil Jurisdiction Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Background
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 16 the jurisdictional
means joining the Republic of Chile in the Letelier-Moffitt case, was hard-
ly unheralded. An earlier version had failed of passage in 1973 because, as
State Department Legal Advisor Monroe Leigh put it, "segments of the
private bar had not been fully consulted as it turned out." 17 The FSIA, as
finally enacted, has been described by its authors and by courts construing
it as, in its substantive definitions of foreign sovereign immunity, merely
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codifying a "restrictive" view which the State Department had adopted
definitively in 1952.18
I suggest, however, that the Act follows as well from two equally,
perhaps more, significant developments in international law. The first is
the increasing recognition that states and their servants have affirmative
obligations to respect the political, social, and economic "human" rights of
individuals and that this obligation is created by international as well as
municipal law. Second, and as a corollary, there is an increasing sense that
individuals as well as states have rights under international law, enforce-
able at their own instance with neither the necessity that a state act as
sponsor-litigant nor the risk that diplomatic considerations will have a
formal role in a tribunal's decision to accept or decline jurisdiction.
Developing Concepts of State Responsibility
Two trends have marked the growth of state responsibility. First, states
have increasingly become involved in commercial ventures of various
types. In doing so, they shed the mantle of sovereignty and become subject
to the myriad rules which govern the world of commerce. The law has
recognized this transition in the familiar jure imperii-jure gestionis distinction,
which determines, based on the activity in question, whether or not a state
is entitled to immunity. 19
The second trend is, in my view, far more significant. The rules of
international law were until recently the creature of the great powers, and
indeed of the great capitalist powers. Since the first world war, and at an
accelerating rate since the second world war, new nations and new social
systems have appeared in the international community. In the capitalist
powers, movements for social change have altered state policy to compel
recognition of "human rights," defined with increasing breadth to include
not only civil rights to freedom of speech and press and to due process of
law, but also the right of self-determination, of freedom from racial dis-
crimination, and even to basic economic and social security. 
20
Other sources spawn broadened human rights. Since the Convenant of
the League of Nations, there has been a growing consensus that aggressive
war violates international law. 21 The Nuremburg Charter and the opinion
of the Tribunal set forth principles of law dealing with war crimes against
the peace, and genocide. 22 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
despite the sharp dispute over the mandatory character of provisions relat-
ing to social and economic rights, has had a great influence in creating
international law based upon custom. 23 This work has been carried for-
ward in many reports and resolutions of the United Nations General As-
sembly. 24 Throughout this process, the increasing voice of Third World
countries with socialist or "mixed" economies, has been of great impor-
tance.
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These trends broaden the obligations of states and create potential bases
of liability not recognized in pre-twentieth century international law. The
FSIA, by codifying a restrictive view of sovereign immunity, establishes
a broadly-based judicial jurisdiction so that governments may be forced to
defend on the merits their failures to fulfill these newly-developed obliga-
tions.
Individuals as Beneficiaries of International Law
G.I. Tunkin, the USSR's leading international law scholar, has written: 25
The principle of respect for basic human rights has become one of the most
important principles of international law. A new branch of international law is
emerging which defines the duties ofstates to ensure the basic rig/is and freedoms to all peoples,
irrespective of race, language, religion, or sex....
International law has intruded into an area which was considered to relate
to the domestic jurisdiction of states and in which specific features of the
different social systems are manifested very prominently and strongly. How-
ever, this "intrusion " of the regulatory influence of international law into the domain of
human rights does not mean that human rights are directly regulated by international law
nor that they have ceased basically to be the domestic affair of a state.
To which one might reply: It all depends on what you mean by "basical-
ly." There are signs that state autonomy is eroding, that individuals are
recognized as subjects of international law, and that one may assert rights
as against one's own sovereign in courts not ultimately responsible to that
sovereign. 26 The European Convention on Human Rights 27 is a step to-
wards putting that principle to work; it permits citizens of signatory states
to bring treaty violations to an international tribunal after municipal reme-
dies are exhausted. The Convention has not been wholly successful in
practice, but its existence and operation have lent currency to the idea that
the fundamental human rights evidenced in United Nations documents
since 1945 are more than precatory admonitions to member states. The
Convention provides one basis for inferring, at a minimum, that there is
a body of customary international law respecting human rights.
American legislation and diplomatic action in the recent past, though far
from uniform on this score, has stressed the duty of states to respect certain
basic rights. 28 To be sure, some of this is big power posturing, telling
smaller powers what to do. But much of it reflects the growing consensus
that what goes on behind a state's borders is somebody else's business.
Of course, in the Letelier case, the Chilean Government had invaded the
territory of the United States in order to commit a terrorist act, so questions
of the regime's right to govern within its own borders may seem inappo-
site. In fact, the matter was not so simple, as I discuss below. 29 Nonethe-
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less, the importance of an international climate of opinion favorable to
human rights cannot be understated in assessing both the provenance and
the proper interpretation of the FSIA.
Analysis of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
By the time the FSIA was passed, the United States had joined the majority
of other capitalist states 30 in adopting the "restrictive" view of sovereign
immunity, and had not departed from the tenor of the so-called "Tate
letter," a restatement of American practice issued in 1952 by the then-legal
advisor of the Department of State. 31 By 1976, a number of states had
codified the restrictive view in one way or another, and other countries
have joined the list since that time. 
32
The Act commanded almost universal support from those who testified
about it during the legislative process: representatives from departments
of government and the private international law bar, as well as legal
scholars. For various reasons, the witnesses agreed that the Act's most
important feature-judicializing immunity determinations-was at least
wise and in all probability essential to the perceived legitimacy of such
decisions. 33
Prior to 1976, a foreign state sued in United States courts would hie
itself to the State Department and ask for an immunity letter. If the State
Department acted favorably, the letter would have the practical effect of
ending the lawsuit. To be sure, the Supreme Court's decision that such
letters should be honored was a judicial determination based upon criteria
for judicial deference developed in a series of foreign affairs cases. But such
wholesale deference came to look very like surrender, particularly because
the State Department's conduct was oft-times redolent of backroom poli-
tics: the department's decision to issue or withhold an immunity determin-
ation was not always based upon a strict reading of the Tate letter. The
department regarded its function as partaking more of "political powers"
-in Marshall's words 34-than of any quasi-judicial duty. It was difficult
to see why litigants with presumably valid claims, often amounting to
great sums, should live at the mercy of the diplomatic considerations
which the State Department felt bound to honor.
Under the Act, the court-a federal court if the foreign state wants it
that way-makes the immunity determination, looking only to the stan-
dards set out in the Act and, in theory at least, not to its own or somebody
else's view of how nice or nasty the state-defendant's government is.
The Act codifies a number of exceptions to a general principle of im-
munity, provides a procedure for serving process on a foreign state, and
defines the assets that may be the subject of execution to satisfy judgment.
A new section of 28 U.S.C., section 1330 confers jurisdiction on United
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States district courts to hear all suits cognizable under the FSIA. A new
section, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), permits removal to federal court of any civil
action against a foreign state, reflecting a by now settled notion that
international law questions, even procedural ones, are inherently federal
in nature.
Section 1608(e) provides that:
No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States or
of a State against a foreign state, a political subdivision therof, or an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
This proof requirement is the same imposed on a litigant suing the United
States in the event the latter defaults, and the Act thus respects an impor-
tant notion of international comity: that a foreign sovereign should be
treated no more harshly than the United States in our courts.
Background for Suit on Behalf of Refugees: Section 1605
The most important provisions of the FSIA for pursued refugees are sec-
tions 1605(a)(2) and (5), denying immunity in cases:
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes
a direct effect in the United States; ...
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment; except this paragraph shall not apply to-
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discre-
tion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
Although only the provisions of section 1605(a)(5), regarding personal
injury or property damage in the United States, seem apposite to refugee
concerns, section 1605(a)(2), the "commercial activity" nonimmunity
provision, also is relevant. Consider the following facts: Chile's state-
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owned flag airline is LAN Chile. LAN Chile facilities and personnel were
regularly used by the Chilean secret police, formerly DINA, to carry per-
sonnel and materiel for use in foreign terrorist operations. The House
Committee on Government Operations has reported that LAN Chile per-
sonnel and facilities were used extensively in the planning and carrying out
of the Letelier assassinations. 35
Arguably, the Letelier-Moffitt murder is "based on" a commercial ac-
tivity, that is, LAN Chile's activity in the United States. The House Com-
mittee did not find that LAN Chile personnel knew the purpose of the false
name travels, nor the contents of packages of explosive and explosive
paraphernalia. Such knowledge might be necessary in order to fasten lia-
bility on LAN Chile if it were joined as a party-defendant. Whether or not
this is so, LAN Chile's activity could provide a jurisdictional basis for suing
the Republic of Chile itself. Certainly the connection may establish a basis
for execution on LAN Chile property in the United States.
Regardless of one's view of section 1605(a)(2), section 1605(a)(5) indis-
putably permits suit of a foreign government whose minions have pursued
a refugee to U.S. shores. A recent article, questioning this conclusion,
states: 36
At the outset, it is useful to remind ourselves that new laws, once adopted,
frequently are put to uses of which their authors never even dreamed, and
this Act is no exception. On August 8, 1978, for example, Isabel Morel de
Letelier, the widow of Chile's ambassador to the United States (and later
foreign minister) under President Salvador Allende, brought suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia against the Republic of
Chile....
Quoting the legislative history, the authors say of subsection 1605(a)(5):
37
"Its inclusion in the Act, according to the section-by-section analysis
accompanying its submission to Congress, was directed primarily at the
problem of traffic accidents." The authors misunderstood both the plain
language of the Act and its legislative history. The quoted passage of the
House Report reads, in its full context: 38 "Section 1605(a)(5) is directed
primarily at the problem of traffic accidents but is cast in general terms as
applying to all tort actions for money damages, not otherwise encompassed
by section 1605(a)(2)... "So much for uses of which the legislators "never
dreamed."
Further, the language of section 1605(a)(5) does not require that the
tortious act or omission occur in the United States. The geographical re-
striction refers not to the place of the act, but to the place where "personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property.. ." occurred. This is
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apparent from the placement of the geographical limitation in the subsec-
tion, as defining what goes before.
This reading of the FSIA gives a refugee pursued in the United States
a broadly drawn civil remedy for all manner of harassing, intimidating, or
violent conduct directed at him by his erstwhile sovereign. For example,
the Letelier-Moffitt murders were planned in general terms in Chile.
Agents were then dispatched to the United States to make contact with
Cuban exiles who worked with the DINA agents to rig the explosive
device. The Cubans performed the actual detonation, while the DINA
agent in charge waited in Miami for the news. When the call came, the
agent, Michael Vernon Townley, boarded a LAN Chile flight under a false
name and flew back to report that the mission was accomplished.
The CNM members are therefore liable for what they did in the District
of Columbia. Townley and Armando Fernandez Larios are liable for their
acts in the United States, and for the preparatory acts in Chile. The Letelier
and Moffitt families also, obtaining personal jurisdiction under the Dis-
trict's long-arm statute, sued DINA officials who, while never leaving
Chile, ordered the murder and helped plan it. The Republic of Chile, based
on the acts of its agents and servants, is liable for all acts causing death and
injury in the United States, regardless of whether a particular act took place
in Chile or in this country.
The language of section 1605(a)(5) makes clear as well that a foreign
sovereign would be liable if its agents sent a letter bomb to a refugee from
abroad, and the bomb exploded causing death or injury. In such a case, no
act or omission need have occurred in the United States; it would be
enough that the prohibited consequences occurred here. There is certainly
nothing offensive to notions of due process in an assertion of jurisdiction
in such a case, particularly because a persuasive argument for liability
would undoubtedly involve foreseeable consequences of a tortious act
performed outside the United States. Most courts are agreed that conduct
which is foreseeably the basis of harm may be the basis for suit where the
harm occurred, without doing violence to the due process clause. 39
Some limits contain the tort jurisdiction conferred by the Act. The
exclusions of section 1605(a)(5)(B) mirror those contained in section
2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 40 prior to the 1974 amendment of
that subsection. While "interference with contract rights" may not be the
basis for a tort action, the same conduct may sound in contract and be the
basis for proceeding under other subsections of section 1605.41
The requirement of section 1605(a)(5) that the official or employee
whose conduct is the predicate for respondeat superior liability of the
sovereign have acted "within the scope of his office or employment" re-
states familiar agency principles in the law of tort, as well as echoing a
concept fundamental to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 42 In the Letelier-
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Moffitt case, the evidence established that the defendant Chilean officials,
Townley and the CNM hit-men were "servants" of the Republic of Chile,
acting within "the scope of [their] employment," as those concepts are
well-established in United States law. 43 The question may also be ap-
proached by analogy to the police misconduct "scope of employment"
cases. The courts reason that sending a policeman out on the streets armed
with dangerous weapons and regarding him as "always on duty" creates
an automatic basis of liability for the municipality, at least as to nondiscre-
tionary acts. 44
In short, the question of respondeat superior status is one of proof,
posing few theoretical problems. When, as in Letelier-Moffitt, the foreign
sovereign and all the individual defendants default, the "scope of employ-
ment" allegation may be deemed admitted as to the individuals. The statu-
tory requirement that proof be adduced to establish liability even if the
foreign sovereign defaults may present some difficulties, which are ad-
dressed below. 45
Discretionary Act
Although it is a part of section 1605(a)(5), the discretionary act exception
is worthy of separate consideration. The exception poses subtle and diffi-
cult problems in the international context. Again, the cognate Federal Tort
Claims Act provisions provide some guidance, as Judge Joyce Hens Green
has held in her opinion in Letelier.46 The exception also affords foreign
states the same treatment as is given the United States Government in its
own courts.
Turning again to the police analogy, the courts have generally held the
day-to-day activities of police and law enforcement officials not to be
"discretionary" so as to immunize the municipality from tort liability. The
District of Columbia Circuit asks in each case whether an officer is likely
to be unduly inhibited in the performance of that function by the threat
of liability for tortious conduct. 47 Police actions, even if authorized at high
levels, are usually found not to be discretionary actions. In a Tort Claims
Act case, Downs v. United States, 48 the court adopted a balancing test: "Does
the value of protecting the individual tortiously injured outweigh the
danger of less effective law enforcement because of imposing such tort
liability?" 49 The court concluded that an FBI agent's handling of a hijack-
ing incident leading to the killing of two hostages did not fall within the
"discretionary act" exemption. Courts are moving to the view that the
decision to establish a program policy, or set of regulations is discretionary
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but choices on how to enforce a policy
or administer a program are not. 50
Applying this test, the planning and execution of the Letelier-Moffitt
assassinations were actions of Chile's agents as police officers, albeit mem-
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bers of a secret police force. All of Chile's agents except the Cubans were
officers or agents of DINA. The killings were typical of DINA's activities
under the leadership of Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, as DINA is demon-
strably responsible for the killing or attempted killing of exiled Chilean
leaders in Argentina, Mexico, and Italy. 51 Chile's agents were executing
policy, not formulating it. They were carrying out clearly-defined duties
assigned them.
Judge Green, responding to Chile's attempts to invoke the "discretion-
ary act" exemption, adopted a slightly different view: 
5 2
While it seems apparent that a decision calculated to result in injury or death
to a particular individual or individuals, made for whatever reason, would
be one most assuredly involving policy judgment and decision and thus
exempt as a discretionary act. . . , that exception is not applicable to bar this
suit. As has been recognized, there is no discretion to commit, or to have
one's officers or agents commit, an illegal act. Whatever policy options may
exist for a foreign country, it has no "discretion" to perpetrate conduct
designed to result in the assassination of an individual or individuals, action
that is clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both
national and international law....
Whatever the details of one's analysis, a foreign sovereign cannot escape
liability by claiming in effect that it has a policy of terrorizing its citizens
in foreign countries, nor by saying that the conduct of high government
officials will necessarily be drawn into question if the suit is permitted to
go forward. While it is certainly true that a foreign sovereign making
economic or political decisions within its own country, whether relating
to the control of its national territory, its citizens, or its natural resources,
enjoys a considerable, though not absolute, immunity from questions, this
immunity does not extend to conduct which injures or kills beyond its
borders.
Act of State
Chile sent Judge Joyce Hens Green a diplomatic note protesting jurisdic-
tion, invoking the "act of state" doctrine, which calls for judicial absten-
tion from inquiry into acts of foreign governments carried out in their own
territory. 53 This effort at evasion had some plausibility because of the
Supreme Court majority's analysis in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 5 4 drawing analogies between sovereign immunity and the act of
state doctrine. Judge Green cut through the act of state tangle thus: 
5 5
Although the acts allegedly undertaken directly by the Republic of Chile to
obtain the death of Orlando Letelier may well have been carried out entirely
within that country, that circumstance alone will not allow it to absolve itself
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under the act of state doctrine if the actions of its alleged agents resulted in
tortious injury in this country. To hold otherwise would totally emasculate
the purpose and effectiveness of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by
permitting a foreign state to reimpose the so recently supplanted framework
of sovereign immunity as defined prior to the Act "through the back door,
under the guise of the act of state doctrine."
Every Supreme Court decision deferring to an "act of state" has involved
actions begun and completed entirely abroad without extraterritorial re-
sults. This much is clear from the reaffirmance in Dunhill of the rule that
transnational deference is due only to acts of a foreign sovereign within
its own territory. 
5 6
As for a supposed analogy between the act of state doctrine and foreign
sovereign immunity, which takes up much of the majority opinion in
Dunhill, 5 7 the FSIA does away with all basis for it; Congress has struck the
balance, put the political branch out of the sovereign immunity business,
made the FSIA the sole basis for making such choices, and put the power
to decide entirely in the hands of the judicial branch. That determination,
says Judge Green, cannot be evaded through a "back door" open to act of
state arguments. The act of state doctrine gives no immunity to transna-
tional terrorism.
Analyzed unclad in inapt analogy, the doctrine is seen as well to have
other significant exceptions: the Supreme Court has left open the question
whether certain foreign acts may be so odious as to be denied recogni-
tion. 5 8 Foreign jurisdictions recognize that ordre public and fraude 4 la loi may
be grounds for denying effect to a foreign decree or act. 59 The forum court
would certainly be justified in concluding that forum notions of ordre public
are offended by immunizing international terror. And the Second Circuit
recently affirmed that the conduct of a foreign official in violation of the
law of nations could not be defended by showing it to have been the
accepted practice in the state where it occurred.
60
Problems of Service and Pleading
Section 1608 gives the pleader many options concerning service: if the
fractious foreign state will not be served by consent, cannot be served
under a treaty, and will not be timely served if the mails are used, the State
Department's facilities are made available. Regulations issued under the
statute make the litigant's task easier. 61
When, as in Lelelier, the foreign state does not submit to the court's
jurisdiction, additional problems arise. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) contemplates that the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter shall be made in the defendant's first responsive pleading,
whether that be an answer or a motion to dismiss. Federal courts are,
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however, of limited jurisdiction, and Rule 12(h)(3) may be read to permit
lack of jurisdiction to be raised by "suggestion." Chile made two such
"suggestions" in Letelier, without otherwise appearing in the action. 62
Plaintiff's motion to strike the second of these, a lengthy pleading sent as
a diplomatic note to the State Department by the Republic of Chile and
forwarded by the department to the clerk of the court, was denied. 63
Plaintiffs' answering motion was premised upon the fact that the note was
in fact a pleading, required to be signed under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11. The district judge treated the note as a "suggestion" of the absence
of jurisdiction, and proceeded to re-evaluate the question and reach a
decision based upon Chile's submissions and without regard to an earlier
entry of default against Chile under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a).
Where the foreign state takes the unusual step of appearing only by
diplomatic protest, the wisdom of Judge Green's approach is manifest.
While a valid decision on jurisdiction might be reached by finding that the
foreign state was playing "fast and loose" and was therefore not entitled
to air the jurisdictional claim, Judge Green, by deciding the question on the
merits, established that the issue of jurisdiction has actually been litigated
and determined; the court's judgment is thus insulated from collateral
attack. 64
Defaults
Defaults have been rare under the Act, and the analogous case law pro-
vides few guideposts for the plaintiff. The proof requirement of section
1608(e), quoted above, requires reference to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The House Report says of section 1608(e): 
6 5
This is the same requirement applicable to default judgments against the U.S.
Government under rule 55(e), F.R.Civ.P. In determining whether the claim-
ant has estabished his claim or right to relief, it is expected the courts will
take into account the extent to which the plaintiff's case depends on appro-
priate discovery against the foreign states.
Rule 55(e) has been characterized as requiring "sufficient evidence," 6 6
that evidence be "adequately presented," 67 and in a leading case, that the
plaintiff "demonstrate that there is some basis on which he is entitled on
the merits of his claim to judgment." 6
8
These generalizations hardly advance analysis beyond the statutory
standard. At best, the rule could be rephrased as requiring the court to find,
in its discretion, that there is some evidentiary basis for the essential
elements of the plaintiff's claim before a default judgment can be entered.
This "some basis" standard may be viewed as analogous to a "probable
cause" requirement.
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In Letelier, Chile's default did not foreclose all avenues of fact-finding.
The plaintiffs took third-party discovery against agencies of the federal
government, deposed a government investigator, researched the congres-
sional materials, interviewed witnesses from Chile, and even sought ad-
missions and sworn answers from DINA agent Townley. On Townley's
refusal to respond, the requests for admission were deemed by the court
to have been admitted. Plaintiffs' counsel was even briefed as to certain
important matters by the secret service of a foreign state. And of course,
the live testimony of witnesses was available on the issue of damages. Such
materials, it may be argued, amply bear the "indiciae of reliability" suffi-
cient to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth.
"69
A defaulting sovereign can hardly claim the identical evidentiary stan-
dard that would have applied had it appeared to defend. The legislative
history makes explicit that courts are expected to take into account the
extent to which the plaintiff's case depends on discovery against the for-
eign state. Chile, in its diplomatic note, had stated that it would not allow
itself to be questioned about this matter. Moreover, the legislative history
of the Act refers to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, which provides
sanctions for failure to make discovery; this citation calls into play the
doctrine of Societe Internationale v. Rogers70 and its progeny: A litigant who will
not provide information required by the rules and who otherwise refused
to cooperate must expect the court to indulge some presumptions against
it as to the underlying facts.
If indeed the defaulting state's obduracy is to influence the standard
applied to "evidence satisfactory" under section 1608(e), plaintiffs should
have little difficulty meeting their burden. It is just that this be so; qui tacet
videt consentire is the legal maxim, and the rule of law is served by making
clear that foreign states will suffer the consequences of not playing by the
rules.
Plaintiffs should, however, consider whether their evidence meets a
higher standard than simply "probable cause;" if it does, so much the
better. The Letelier-Moffitt plaintiffs had the record in the criminal case,
United States v. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, et al. 71 The evidence had been
adduced under oath and subject to vigorous cross-examination, and
therefore bore "indiciae of reliability," though the only defendants tried
were the three captured CNM members. In the analogous case of United
States v. Knox, 72 an action to recover money, allegedly the proceeds of the
sale of stolen government property, the court entered a default judgment
based upon the record in a related criminal case.
Hearsay declarations may be admitted under the "evolving expansive
exceptions" of Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5), 73 or where
someone has confessed, as Townley had, as declarations against penal
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interest. 74 Government reports of various kinds may be admissible-these
being civil cases-under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). 7
Collechbiliy of Judgments
Prior to the FSIA, the United States courts took a latitudinous view of
foreign state immunity from execution. The statutory reform in sections
1609-11 was welcomed by the profession, the general view being "what
use is the right to sue if you can't collect?"
Section 1609 establishes a general rule of immunity, and section 1610
lists exceptions to the general rule, somewhat narrowly for "foreign states"
and more broadly for agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states.
Section 1611 lists the "exceptions to the exceptions," and in general puts
foreign currency reserves and military goods beyond the reach of execu-
tion under almost all circumstances. Section 1610(a)(4)(B) puts diplomatic
premises out of reach.
In addressing the problem of collection, one turns first, therefore, to
exceptions to immunity enumerated in section 1610(a):
(1) express or implied waiver;
(2) the property [sought to be executed upon] is or was used for the
commercial activity upon which the claim is based;
(3) the property was taken in violation of international law and the
judgment is in rem;
(4) the property is the subject of an in rem judgment relating to succes-
sion or gift;
(5) the conduct sued upon is covered by a policy of liability insurance.
For our purposes, the first, third, and fifth provisions are obviously the
most important.
The provision on waiver, according to the House Report,
is governed by the same principles that apply to waivers of immunity from
jurisdiction under section 1605(a)(1) of the bill. A foreign state may have waived
its immunity from execution, inter alia, by the provisions of a treaty, a contract, an offeial
statement, or certain steps taken by the foreign state in the proceedings, leading to judgment
or to execution. As in section 1605(a)(1), a waiver on behalf of an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state may be made either by the agency or
instrumentality or by the foreign state itself. 76
One example of an express waiver is the foreign flag air carrier waiver of
immunity with respect to certain matters, a regulatory condition of obtain-
ing landing rights in the United States. 77
If the Report's view is sustained by the courts, a general appearance by
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the foreign state without raising the defense of immunity, being sufficient
to confer jurisdiction under section 1605, would also subject the foreign
state to attachment in aid of execution. Such plenary implicit waivers will
probably be rare, and some distinguished judges have warned against an
expansive attitude towards implicit waiver. 78 Judge Weinstein of the East-
ern District of New York suggests that commercial activity should under
almost no circumstance be considered to evidence waiver, and cites the
legislative history in support of his view. 
79
Section 1610(a)(2) sounds rather like the jurisdictional provision in sec-
tion 1605(a)(2), but the two provisions are by no means coterminous.
Rather, section 1610(a)(2) is broader, as suggested by the House Report,
which says that "activities encompassed by Section 1605(a)(2)" are "in-
cluded," but goes on to list other uses of section 1610(a)(2).8 0 The Report
also contains the following interesting comment: 81
The courts will have to determine whether property "in the custody of" an
agency or instrumentality is property "of" the agency or instrumentality,
whether property held by one agency should be deemed to be property of
another, whether property held by an agency is property of the foreign state.
This language imports a kind of "veil-piercing" standard, permitting the
plaintiff to argue that property held by entity A should for purposes of
execution be considered that of entity B or even of the foreign state itself;
it should be read together with section 1603, which defines "foreign state"
to include for almost all statutory purposes "a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."
Section 1610(a)(2) should permit execution on the property of a state-
owned corporation whose facilities and personnel were used as a cover for
the tortious conduct of foreign state agents. The corporation itself might
not be liable, because of ignorance that it was being so used, or at least
because of the difficulty of a plaintiff proving knowledge. But the statute
as literally read permits execution on the corporation's property because
its activity is in some real sense the "basis" of the plaintiff's claim. In such
a situation, recalling the LAN Chile-DINA connection, it seems fair to
disregard the nominal separation between the entity called Chile and the
entity called LAN Chile, and the legislative history supports doing just
that.
Rarely will a foreign state insure against the sort of pursuit of refugees
which was the subject of the Letelier-Moffitt case and section 1610(a)(5)
therefore seems unhelpful. However, the pleader can provide for every
contingency by drafting the complaint artfully. Bombings, shootings,
harassment, and coercive conduct involve international infliction of harm
upon the plaintiff, but the conduct often creates a reckless or negligent risk
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of harm to others than the intended victim. A complaint drafted to include
allegations of such reckless or negligent conduct would enhance the plain-
tiff's chances to collect if, as is sometimes the case, the foreign state has
an insurance policy that broadly insures its agents for nonintentional torts,
in the pattern of any standard liability policy. So while it is true that
terrorism insurance is more likely to be carried by those who fear they will
be victims than by those who are intending to be perpetrators, this does
not end the matter.
Collection Without Execution
A foreign state which suffers a judgment for an act of terror and refuses
to pay it deserves the condemnation of other states and of international
organizations. An enlightened foreign policy would use diplomatic pres-
sure to compel payment. Congressional appropriations for aid might prop-
erly be conditioned on payment, or might even provide for an offset.
International monetary authorities might be urged to lend a voice in sup-
port of a foreign state meeting its obligations to the plaintiffs.
The transnational validity of a judgment rendered by a court of the
United States might also be a route to collection. The international recogni-
tion of judgments-international "full faith and credit"-is a well-settled
principle of international law, 8 2 subject in the case of judgments against
a foreign state to local municipal immunity provisions as well as to the
recognized fraude d la loi and ordre public exceptions. 8 3 If the foreign state in
which suit is brought on the judgment has a more liberal rule than the
United States on execution, collection is obviously easier. Too, suing on the
United States judgment and obtaining a foreign judgment as well may
increase the diplomatic pressure on the offending state. These are matters
more of strategy than of formal legal rules, but adherence to international
law is often secured by means other than formal.
THE BASES OF FOREIGN STATE LIABILITY
No purpose is served by listing the garden-variety torts which may be
committed by the agents of a foreign state bent on pursuing its subject into
a country of refuge. Subject only to the specific exclusions of section 1605
(a)(5)(B), these are the bases of claims upon which relief may be granted
to refugee plaintiffs. However, other theories of liability may be available;
the innovative lawyer and the politically-motivated client will probably
agree they should be put forward. In the Letelier-Moffitt case, two nontra-
ditional tort claims were asserted, each of which may be paradigmatic:
violation of a statutory duty, and tortious conduct in violation of the laws
of nations.
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Implication of Private Civil Cause
of Action from Criminal Statute
It is commonly said that a criminal statute provides a standard for all
reasonable members of the community, and that actions in violation of a
criminal statute are persenegligent. 84 In the federal courts, these hornbook
principles must be viewed in light of Cori v. Ash85 and the cases which
follow it, including Cannon v. University of Chicago. 86 The Supreme Court
requires that four questions be asked in seeking a private remedy implied
in a statute not expressly providing for one:
(1) Is plaintiff one of the persons in the class for whose special benefit
the statute was enacted?
(2) Was the legislative intent in enacting the statute to create such a
remedy?
(3) Is implication of a private remedy consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme?
(4) Is the cause of action traditionally relegated to state law and so
inappropriate to base soley on federal law? 87
The Supreme Court has indicated that the "right- or duty-creating
language of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of
the propriety of implication of a cause of action." 88 The Court has usually
inferred a cause of action if the statutory language conferred a right direct-
ly on a class of persons construed to include the plaintiffs, civil rights
statutes being one prime example. In Letelier the operative statute was 18
U.S.C. § 1116:
(a) Whoever kills or attempts to kill a foreign official, official guest, or
internationally protected person shall be punished as provided under sec-
tions 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title, except that any such person who is
found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for life....
(3) Foreign official means-
(A) ... Ambassador, Foreign Minister ... or any person who has previously
served in such capacity....
This section has its own conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1117.
Orlando Letelier was, according to statutory definition, a "foreign offi-
cial." The Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests
of the United States, 89 of which sections 1116 and 1117 were a part, was
enacted for the express purpose of providing the federal government with
authority to protect foreign officials and official guests against violations
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of their persons and property. Congress was anxious to deter increasing
"acts of physical violence against members of the diplomatic corps and
other foreign officials and official guests in our community .... - 9 The
immediate occasion of this legislation was the murder of Israeli athletes by
Palestinian terrorists in Munich at the 1972 Olympics. Congress clarified
that it intended to protect "the rights of visiting artist, academic and
scientific groups, and other groups and individuals who ought not to be
beyond the pale of Federal concern." 91 In a 1976 amendment to this
legislation, "internationally protected persons" were added as a class of
individuals specially protected by the federal government against terrorist
acts. The amendment implements two international conventions, one
sponsored by the United Nations and one by the Organization of Ameri-
can States, to both of which the United States was signatory. 92 Moreover,
the jurisdictional statute, the FSIA, has taken the executive branch out of
immunity determinations; the principles of plaintiffs' choice and judicial
decision are to rule. It is therefore consistent to permit private redress of
the public wrong occasioned by violation of criminal statutes.
Finally, federal and not state courts are the proper forums within which
to conduct litigation of most international questions, and especially of
alleged terrorist actions against foreign officials. In fact, the inappropriate-
ness of leaving such prosecutions to state law enforcement officials was
precisely the reason for enacting the protective legislation, a judgment
reinforced by the removal provision of the FSIA itself.
Implication of Private Civil Cause
of Action from International Custom
International custom has long been held one of the primary sources of
international law. The seminal case of The Paquete Habana93 held that coast-
wise fishing vessels, when unarmed and pursuing their calling, are exempt
from capture as prizes of war. The Supreme Court, although it found no
express treaty or public act to guide it, reached this decision by finding that
the "customs and usages of civilized nations" 94 allowed fishermen of all
nations to go about their business without military interference.
It is now beyond dispute that federal courts have the authority to
determine and apply international custom, and that it is part of the "laws"
of the United States which may be interpreted and applied at the suit of
private individuals. 95
No sovereign nation tolerates the assassination of foreign government
officials on its soil. A number of international covenants and declarations
evidence this international custom of condemning terrorist acts directed at
representatives of foreign governments residing in other nations, including
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
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International Covenant of Civil Rights, the Pact of San Jose of November
22, 1969 (the American Covention on Human Rights), and the General
Assembly Declaration of Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereign-
ty. 
96
The documents are standards embodying the sense of decency and
humanity of civilized nations that terrorist acts should be condemned: in
short, custom. The executive branch of the United States Government has
joined in this condemnation by signing many of these conventions, and
Chile has signed the two covenants and the Pact of San Jose.
In determining whether the law of nations defines a tort, the list of
conventions and United Nations actions is suggestive and not definitive.
However, treatise after treatise, case after case, treaty after treaty condemn
the sort of terrorism which has stalked refugees fleeing oppression. 97 The
sources of international law are more various and more recondite than the
sources of municipal law, at least in Western countries. 98 The pursuit of
refugees may be regarded as violating one of the most important principles
of the post-World War II legal order: the prohibition on the use or threat
of force except in certain narrowly-defined cases. 99 This principle has
indeed been elaborated by a committee of the General Assembly to include
territorial incursions, acts of reprisal, and terrorism, 100 all elements of the
conduct at issue in Letelier.
CONCLUSION
The Letelier-Moffitt murders are certainly a reproach to those who planned
the destabilization of the Allende government, and who cooperated with
the military chieftains and their secret police before and after the Septem-
ber 1973 coup; so to observe is, however, only to point out one more
instance of a consistent and often tragic error of American postwar policy
towards leftist and reform movements in the Third World. American poli-
cy decisions fomenting or encouraging repressive regimes are bound to
"bring home" serious consequences. "Educate a crow and it will pluck out
your eyes," goes the old Spanish proverb.
Why have foreign secret police agencies been permitted to operate
within our borders? These agencies are the stepchildren of the CIA. They
are the emissaries of friendly foreign governments, or at least of govern-
ments we do not wish to risk offending. Reasons of state.
Given that there is precious little motivation for the American Govern-
ment to drive these intruders out, or even effectively to curtail their activi-
ties, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is of particular value.
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Irrespective of the direction and strength of the political winds, the plain-
tiff is entitled to bring a claim into the public forum and litigate it.
The two most powerful words in our language, when uttered by a
claimant for justice, are these: I accuse. I accuse, though the "official ver-
sion" of events does not support me. I accuse, though "reasons of state"
seek to cloak the matter in fustian prose or in flat denial. Here is the larger
significance of the Act: it promises a remedy, but guarantees a forum. And
the powerful and compelling claims for justice which may be aired in such
a forum can be, as the past teaches us, very like Diderot's "strange god": 101
The rule of Nature and of my Trinity, against which the gates of Hell shall
not prevail .... establishes itself very quietly. The strange god settles himself
humbly on the altar beside the god of the country. Little by little he estab-
lishes himself firmly. Then one fine morning he gives his neighbor a shove
with his elbow and-crash!-the idol lies upon the ground.
NOTES
1 The factual background to the Letelier-Moffitt murders is available from two readily
accessible public sources. S. LANDAU & J. DINGEs, ASSASSINATION ON EMBASSY Row (1980), is the
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government in Chile, its 1976 forcible overthrow in a CIA-supported military coup, and the
junta's persecution of former Allende officials and supporters. The book, a product of three
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opinions in Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980); No. 78-1477
(D.D.C., filed Nov. 5, 1980) summarize the relevant facts, The transcript of record and
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are verifiable from the Landau-Dinges book or the cited opinions. See also United States v.
Novo Sampol, No. 79-1541 (D.C. Cir., Sept, 15, 1980) reversing the convictions of some of
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3 d. at 384.
4 Id. at 380.
5 Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1980, § A at 1, cols, 4-5, § A, at 17, cols. 1-6.
6 The Privacy Act defines "individual" as "a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence," and is intended, unlike the Freedom of Informa-
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COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SUBCOMM. ON
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1974, S. 3418 (Pub. L. No. 93-579) 232 (1976); Raven v, Panama Canal Co., 583 F.2d 169 (5th
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meaning of the Privacy Act, and thus not entitled to disclosure). Regulations under the
Privacy Act are scattered throughout the Code of Federal Regulations. A list, agency by
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involvement, in the trial of their case.
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Justice, Hearings, supra note 17, at 24-37.
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community have led to expressions by capitalist and socialist powers alike containing a
consensual view of human rights in the international community. At least this consensus,
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22 See Treaty of London, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279;
Nurnberg Tribunal Judgments, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946). $ee also TUNKIN, supra note 21, at 396-425.
23 See TUNKIN, supra note 21, at 79-83. Excerpts form the Declaration, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), and other related documents are contained in BIsHOP, supra note 21,
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create binding norms of international law is agreed by Tunkin in Chapter 5 (with some
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